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PEOPLE v. DEWBERRY [51 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 6335. In Bank. Feb. 6, 1959.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JOHN DEWBERRY, 
. Appellant. 
[1] Homicide-Evidence-Second Degree Murder.-A conviction 
of second degree murder was supported by the testimony of 
an eyewitness that defendant, who had for some time been 
gambling and dl'inking in a bar, told the bartender that 
he wished to take care of his bill, spread his roll of money on 
the bar, accused the deceased of taking his money and de-
manded its return, that the deceased stated he was not taking 
defendant's money but merely keeping it for him to protect 
him, that in the course of the ensuing argument (during 
which defendant said he did not need the deceased's pro-
tection but had his own protection) the witness saw the de-
ceased put his hand in his pocket and pass something over to 
his wife, that defendant told the deceased's wife to put his 
money on the bar, repeated his demand to the deceased, took 
out his revolver and shot the deceased, and that the witness 
did not hear the deceased threaten defendant or make a move 
toward him, since the jury could reasonably conclude from 
such testimony that defendant shot the deceased without the 
provocation necessary to make the homicide manslaughter or 
the deliberation and premeditation necessary to make it first 
degree murder. 
[2] Oriminal Law-Instructions - Witnesses - Oredibility.-In a 
prosecution for murder and for unlawfully carrying a weapon, 
it was not error to refuse an instruction that the fact that a 
witness had been convicted of a felony may be considered by 
the jury "for only one purpose, namely, in judging the credi-
bility of that witness," where other instructions that it was 
for the jury alone to judge the credibility of witnesses and 
the weight to be ginn the evidence offered, that every person 
is presumed to speak the truth, and that a witness may be im-
peached by inconsistent statements, by contradictory evidence 
or by evidence that he had been convicted of a felony, cor-
rectly stated the law, and where the requested instruction ! 
was incorrect in that defendant's convictions were not in evi-
dence for the quoted purpose only, but were an essential ele-
ment in the charged violation of the Deadly Weapons Act. 
(Pen. Code, § 12021.) 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 146; [2] CdlJlinul Law, 
§834; [3] Criminal Lnw, §912; [4-6] Criminal I.nw, §58~(]); 
[7] Homicide, § 182; [8] Criminnl Law, § 1437 (9) j [9] Homicide, 
§ 229. 
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[5] 
[6] 
Id.-Inntructlons-Right. to Convict of Lesser Offenses.-W~en 
the evidence is suffid(,lIt to support. ft finding of guilt of both 
the offense charged IIno a lesser included offense, the JUTy must 
be instructed that if they entertain a reRsonable doubt as to 
which offense has been committed they must find defendant 
guilty only of the lesser offense. 
Id.-Evidence-Reasonable Doubt-Doubt as to Degree of 
Offense.-Pen. Code, § 1097, providing that "Where it appears 
that defendant has committed a public offense, and there is 
rcasonnble ground of doubt of which of two or more offenses 
he is guilty, he can be convicted of the lowest of such de-
grees only," presupposes that the jury has concluded that de-
fendant is guilty of some public offense embraced within the 
pleadings but is in doubt as to the degree of the offense proved. 
The words "offense" and "degrees," as used therein, refer to 
all the degrees of criminality involved in a criminal act, not 
only to the specifically defined degrees of a single offense, so 
that an unlnwful killing may involve not only the two degrees 
of murder, but also the included offense of manslaughter. 
Id.-Evidence-Reasonable Doubt.-In every case the prin-
ciple of reasonable doubt requires an acquittal of an offense 
when the prosecution has not met its burden of proof. 
Id.-Evidence-Reasona.ble Doubt.-Where reasonable doubt 
exists as between degrees of the same offense or as between 
the inclusive and included offense, the jury can only convict of 
the crime whose elements have been proved beyond a reason-
able doubt. 
[7] Homicide-Instructions-Degrees of Offense-Conviction of 
Included Offenses.-In a proposed instruction in a homicide 
ease that if the jury "entertained a reasonable doubt as to the 
degree of the crime of which [defendant] is guilty, it is your 
duty to convict him only of the lesser offense," "degrec of the 
crime" refers, not to the degrees of murder alone, but to de-
grees of eriminal homicide including manslaughter, and ''lesser 
offenses" refers to the lesser of the two degrees of criminal 
homicide between which the doubt exists; the instruction thus 
mnkes clear that the principle of reasonable doubt applies not 
only between first and second degree murder but also between 
second degree murder and mnnslaughter. 
[Sa, Sb] Oriminal Law-Appea.l-Harmless and Reversible Error-
Instructions.-In a prosecution for murder and for unlawfully 
carrying n weapon, the court's fnilure to instruct on tbe effect 
of a reasonable doubt as between any of the included offenses, 
[3] See Am.Jur., Trilll, § 790. 
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 112; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 1256. 
[7] See Am.Jur., Homicide, § 541. 
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when it had instructed as to the effect of such doubt as be-
tween tbe two higbe5t offenses and as between the lowest of-
fensc lind justifiable homicidc, lcft the instructions with the 
clearly erroneous implication that the rule requiring a finding· 
of guilt of the lesser offense applied only as between first and 
f;ecpnd degrec murder, and where thc case was a dose one on 
the facts and, though there was sufficient evidence to support 
a conviction or second degree murder, a. finding thnt the of-
fense was m3nslauZhter would be equally warranted; tIle error 
was prejudicial insofar as the conviction of second degree 
murder was concerned, but had no bearing on defendant's 
conviction of unlawfully cnrrying a weapon. 
[9] Bomicide-Instructions-Evidence-Reasonable Doubt.-In a 
murder prosecution, where there was evidence that deceased 
had taken defendant's money in a bar and only returned part 
of it, passing the rest to his wife, and defendant testified that 
deceased made a menacing gesture toward him and told him 
that if he did not shut up ]le would lose more than his money, 
defendant was entitled to have this evidence considered in the 
light of the rule of reasonflble doubt, not only on the issue of 
self-defense, but also on the issue of provocation sufficient to 
reduce the killing from second degree murder to manslaughter, 
and it was error not to give nn instruction as to the defense 
of reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt of second degree 
murder, sinee it was elenrly responsive to an issue raised by 
the evidence. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco and from an order denying 
a new trial. Walter Carpeneti, Judge. Affirmed in part and 
reversed in part. 
Prosecution for murder and for unlawfully carrying a 
weapon. Judgment of conviction reversed as to conviction of 
second degree murder on count charging murder, and affirmed 
as to conviction of possession of a pistol by an ex-convict on 
the other count. 
Gladstein, Andersen, Leonard & Sibbett, George R. Ander-
sen and Norman Leonard for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clari'l1(·e A. Linn, 
Assistant Attorney General, and John S. Mdllerny, Deputy 
At torney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Dcf\'lIJanl appeals from a judgment of 
convictioll entered Oil a jur~· ver,lid finding him guilty of 
second degrt'c murder and of a violation of section 120:'U of 
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tIle Peual Code (possession of a pistol by an ex-convict). He 
also appeals from the order denying his motion for a new 
trial. He ('ontends that the evidence is insufficil'nt to support 
the verdict alld that the refusal to give certain rcquested in-
st.ructions was prejudicial error. 
The circumstances of the homicide were relatl'd at the trial 
by two witnesses, Jesse Mosley and defendant. Mosley testi-
fied that about 7 :30 a.m. on Sunday, October 14, 1956, hc 
went toa bar in San Francisco. He sat near the door and 
consumed two bourbon highballs. He had been in the bar 
about 45 minutes when defendant entered and sat about 10 
feet from him. )Iosley did not know defendant, but had seen 
him before and had heard his name. Defendant went to the 
telephone several times and complained about not being able 
to reach his sister. 
In the course of a conversation about gambling between 
defendant and another customer defendant took a large roll 
of bills from his pocket. The two agreed to gamble and de-
fendant stated that he did not want any foolishness about his 
money and that he carried his own protection. He then showed 
the revolver he was carrying. Defendant repocketed the 
pistol and the two left the bar. A short time later, defend-
ant returned. 
The deceased, Rudolf Glover, entered the bar at about 9 
a.m. with a woman whom he introduced as his wife to Mosley 
and the others. Glover and defendant each bought a round of 
drinks for the six or seven other customers. 
About 10 :45 a.m. the television set was turned on for a 
Forty-Niner football game. Mosley moved to a booth in the 
rear to see better. About this time defendant told the bar-
tender he wished to take care of his bill and spread his roll 
of money on the bar. 
A few minutes later, two people Bat in front of Mosley and 
blocked his view of the screen, so he started back to his original 
seat. As he was walking toward the front of the bar he heard 
defendant accuse Glover of taking his money and demand its 
return. Glover stated that he was not taking defendant's 
money but merl'Iy keeping it for him to protect him" Defend-
ant told Glover that be did not need JJis protection, that he 
had Ilis own protection. Both defendant and Glover were 
stmuling, about tIlTf'f' hal' stuols or 10 ff't't apart. Df'ft'ndant 
again tlelJlllIHl('d HIIlt. Gl()w~r retnrll the money. 
In the course of the argument, Mosley saw Glover put his 
hand in his pocket and pass something to Mrs. Glover. De-
) 
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fendant then told Mrs. Glover to put his money on the bar 
and repcated hill dcmand to Glover. Thereupon defelldHllt 
took out his revolver, cocked it, and fired oncc. Glovcr turned 
aild fell. At no time did Mosley hear Glover thrcaten defend-
ant or sec him make a move toward defendaut . 
. Defcndant turned Glover over and went through his 
pockets. Mrs. Glover began to cry as she put her head on 
Glover's chest. She then started for thc door, but defendant 
asked her for the rest of his money. When she failed to give 
it to him, he hit her in the face, knocking her down. He 
pointed the pistol at her and said, "If you don't give me my 
money I will kill you too." Mosley took the money from Mrs. 
Glover. Defendant had the bartender count it for him and 
when he was told the amount he stated that he was still 
about $100 short. 
Meanwhile, someone had called an ambulance and the 
police. Officer Dobleman testified that when he 81'rived at 
the bar, defendant handed him a .38 caliber revolver with 
five live rounds and one discharged shell in thc cylinder. De-
fendant told the officer, "He tried to take my money and 
I did it." Shortly thereafter defendant made substantially 
the same statement to Inllpector McDonald of the homicide 
detail. It appeared to the officers that at the time he was 
questioned defendant had been drinking but was in full 
control of his faculties and had no trouble speaking. 
Defendant testified that he was a professional gambler and 
a car salesman and admitted two prior felony convictions. 
He had spent the previous night drinking and gamhling in 
San Mateo, had met a friend in San Francisco about 5 a.m., 
had a few more drinks, and went to the bar about 8 a.m. He 
was waiting there to get in touch with his sister to give hcr 
money for the care of his mother. While he was waiting, he 
talked to another customer about gambling, but he denied 
showing him the pisto1. He went upstairs and gambled with 
11im for about 45 minutes and won $55. 
When he returned to the bar, he had a brief conversation 
with the bartender about his bar bill. He paid it and then 
lipread his money out along the bar so that he could arrange 
it according to denomination. He kncw he had $1,252. While 
hc was sorting and arranging the money, Mrs. Glover told him 
to take it off the bar. Defendant told hE'r to millu her own 
business and slle walked awa~·. GJovE'r t111'1J walked to till' har 
and picked up the DlOney. Dcfenollut IIt(lppetl llim lind as}{ed 
him to return it. GIonr put some money hack on the bar, but 
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ilerendant could sef' t.hat. five $100 hills werc missing. At de· 
fendant's request, the bartender counted the money and found 
about $700. After defendant's repeated demands for the 
return of his money, Glover reached in his pocket and raised 
his arm toward defendant. Glover had told defendant that 
if he did not shut up he would lose more than his money. One 
James McCoy had told him that the deceased had a reputation 
of being belligerent. Defendant said he tried to fire the pistol 
to the right of Glover, but with no intention to hit him. He 
had won the weapon in the game in San Mateo and was not 
sure it was loaded until he pulled the trigger. He denied 
threatening Mrs. Glover. 
The testimony of the autopsy surgeon tended to corroborate 
defendant's story about Glover's raising his arm toward 
defendant. James McCoy, called by the People in rebuttal, 
denied telling defendant anything about Glover. 
[1] There is no merit in defendant's contention that the 
evidence was insufficient to support the conviction of second-
degree murder. Murder is the unlawful killing of a human 
being with malice aforethought. (Pen. Code, § 187.) Such 
malice may be express or implied. It is express when there 
is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away 
the life of a fellow-creature. It is implied, when no consider-
able pro,'ocation appears, or when the circumstances attending 
the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. (Pen. 
Code, § 188.) The jury could reasonably conclude from the 
testimony of the prosecution's eyewitness that defendant shot 
the deceased without the provocation necessary to make the 
homicide manslaughter or the deliberation and premeditation 
necessary to make it first-degree murder. Defendant's testi-
mony of provocation served only to create a conflict in the 
evidence. (People v. Wein, 50 Ca1.2d 383, 398-399 [326 P.2d 
457] ; People v. Brust, 47 Ca1.2d 776, 783 [306 P.2d 480] ; 
People v. Pope, 130 Ca1.App.2d 321, 825 [279 P.2d 108].) 
[a] Defendant contends that the court erred in refusing 
to give the following instruction: 
"The fact that a witness had been convicted of a felony, 
if such be a fact, may be considered by you for only one 
JJUrpose, namely, in jUdging the credibility of tllat witness. 
The fact of such a conviction does not necessarily destroy or 
impair the witness's credibility, and it does not raise a pre-
sumption that the witness has testified falsely. It is simply 
one of the circumstances that you are to take into consideration 
ill weighing the testimony of such a witness. " 
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Th(' jury was instructed that it was for them alone to 
judge the credibilit.y of the witneRReR ann the weight to be 
given the evidencc offered; that every person is presumed 
to spcak tIle trutll; and t11at a witness may be impeached by 
inconsistent statements, by contradictory eyidence, or by 
evidence that he has been convicted of a felony. These in-
structions correctly stated the law. Moreover, under the cir-
cumstances of the present case, the requested instruction 
was incorrect. Defendant's convictions were not in t lJe 
evidence •• for only one purpose, namely, in judging the 
credibility of that witness." They were an essential element 
in tbe cbarged violation of the Deadly Weapons Act. (Pen. 
Code, § 12021.) 
Defendant's most serious contention is that the court 
erred in refusing to give the following instruction: 
"You may find the defendant guilty of any offense, the 
commission of which is necessarily included in that with 
which he is charged, if, in your judgment, the evidence sup-
ports such a verdict under my instructions. 
"To enable you to apply the foregoing instruction, if your 
findings of fact require you to do so, I instruct you that the 
offense of murder, of which the defendant is charged in 
Count I of the indictment, necessarily includes the crime of 
manslaughter. 
"If you find that defendant was guilty of. an offense in-
cluded within the charge of the indictment, but entertain a 
reasonable doubt as to the degree of the crime of which he is 
guilty, it is your duty to convict him only of the lesser 
offense." (CALJIC [1946 ed.] Instructions Nos. 115-115A.) 
'!'he jury was instructed on the elements of the crimes of 
murder and manslaughter. The court explained that there 
are two degrees of murder and that if the jurors were con-
vinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had com-
mitted the crime of murder but entertained a reasonable doubt 
as to the degree, tbey should give defendant the benefit of 
the doubt and find him guilty of second degree murder. Thc 
jury was also instructed that if they were in doubt as to 
whether the killing was manslaughter or justifiable homicitlt', 
defendant was to be acquitted. Finally, the (,Ol11"t illstructed 
the jury that defl."ndant was presumed innocent of any crime 
uutil the contrary had been proved, and in case of reasonaule 
doubt, was entitled to an acquittal, and that the prrsnmptioll 
of innocence attaches at every stage of the case and to every 
fact essential to a conviction. 
) 
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! Defendant contends that because the instructions on man-
slaughter were not accompanied with the further instruction 
that ill the ca.<;e of a reasonable doubt as between second 
degree murder and manslaughter, defendant was to be found 
guilty of manslaughter, the jury was given the impression 
that the rule requiring a finding of guilt of the lesser offense 
applied only as between degrees of murder. 
[3] It has been consistently held in this state since 1880 
that when the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of 
guilt of both the offense charged and a lesser included of-
fense, the jury must be instructed that if they entertain a 
reasonable doubt as to which offense has been committed, they 
must find the defendant guilty only of the lesser offense. 
(People v. lams, 57 Cal. 115, 121, 130; People v. Newcomer, 
118 Cal. 263, 270-271 [50 P. 405] ; People v. MarslwU, 120 
Cal. 70, 70-71 [52 P. 129] ; People v. Burl1s, 88 Cal.App.2d 
867, 871~873 [200 P.2d 134] ; see also McAffee v. United Stotes, 
105 F.2d 21, 31 [70 App.D.C. 142] ; People v. Marqu·is, 153 
Cal.App.2d 553, 556-558 [315 P.2d 57] ; People v. Miller, 67 
Cal.App. 674, 678-679 [228 P. 68] ; 20 A.L.R. 1258, 1259; 26 
Am.Jur., Homicide, § 541.) The People contend, however, 
that this rule is inconsistent with section 1097 of the Penal 
Code, which provides that "Where it appears that the de-
fendant has committed a public offense, and there is reasonable 
ground of doubt of which of two or more degrees he is guilty, 
he can be convicted of the lowest of such degrees only." They 
contend that this section is limited on its face to degrees of 
the same offense and that the proposed instruction is therefore 
erroneous because murder and manslaughter are distinct 
offenses. 
[4] Section 1097 presupposes that the jury has concluded 
tllUt the defendaut is guilty of some public offense embraced 
within the pleadings but is in doubt as to the degree of the 
offense proved. The question presented is whetJler the words 
"offense" and "degrees" refer only to the specifically defined 
degrees of a single offense, or refer to all the degrees of 
criminality that may be involved in a criminal- act. Thus, 
an unlawful killing may involve not only the two degrces 
of murder, but also the included offense of manslaugllter. 
·rhere is no rcason for not applying the general principle 
of reasonable doubt 10 both sit nat jOJl~. Givt>l1 the owrriding 
hasie }ll"in('iple of reasollable dOllLt, the admonition that tl1e 
Pellal Code is to be intcrp.reted "with a view to effect its 
objeC"ls and to promote justice" (Pen. Code, § 4), and t11e 
) 
) 
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anomaly that would otherwise result, we ':;UJUl:llUUe 
words "offense" and "degrees" in section 1097 "Af·";1':h-:~j·'~ 
th(' degrees of criminality involved in a criminal act. " 
Even if we were to conclude, however, that section 
refers only to specifically defined degrees of single offenses' 1 
~ivided into degrees, it would not follow. th~t the instruciiol1 ';j 
IS erroneous. [5] In every case the prIncIple of reasonable"! 
doubt requires an acquittal of an offense when the p~~! 
cution has not met its burden of proof. [6] Thus, whe~fl.'j 
reasonable doubt exists as between degrees of the samef)tJ~j 
or as betwee~ the inclu~ive and included o1fense,the.·~pv~~ 
can only conVIct of the CrIme whose elements have been Pl1JY~t~ 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Narrowly constmed, section \109,'Ur 
at most illustrates the application of the mle in the case 1i&~ 
crimes divided into degrees. It does not abrogate its • .P.E~ 
plication in other situations. (See Southern Calif. GtII'Cti,.1t. 
v. City of Los Angeles, 50 Cal.2d 713,719-720 [329 P.2d 28~j;J~ 
City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale, 23 Cal.2d 68, 77 [I.~-i] 
P.2d 289] ; Strand Improvement Co. v. City of Lon,g B~~ 
173 Cal. 765, 772-773 [161 P. 975].) Accordingly, unc1~1) 
either interpretation, it aft'ords no basis for departing 'fro~] 
the settled law. (People v.lams, supra, 57 Cal. 115, 121,180,~; 
People v. Newcomer, supra, 118 Cal. 263, 270-271; People "/1 
Marshall, supra, 120 Cal. 70, 70-71; People v. Burns, .upra,i 
88 Ca1.App.2d 867, 871-873; see also McAf!~e v. Unifed 8f~f~:~ 
supra, 105 F.2d 21, 31; People v. MarquJ.S, supra, 153 oat:;,: 
App.2d 553, 556-558; People v. Miller, supra, 67 Cal-!--?P'it 
674, 678-679; 20 A.L.R. 1258, 1259; 26 Am.Jur., HOID1Cl~~ 
§ 54 .); 
['1] The People cont.end, however, that the proposed, '. ' 
struction is erroneous in its statement of the mle of reasonable ~ 
doubt between second degree murder and manslaughter. They~~ 
object to the language that if you "entertain a reasonable \ 
doubt as to the degree of the crime of which he is guilty, it : 
is your duty to convict him only of the lesser o1fense." They 
point out that it is only murder that is divided into degrees 
and contend that the jury would relate "degree of the crime" 
to degrees of murder, "lesser o1fense" to manslaughter, and 
conclude that under the proposed instmction doubt as to the 
degree of murder would require a verdict of manslaughter. 
The instmction caunot reasonably be construed to reach such 
an obviou.~ly absul'u rellult. When read in context it is obvi-
ous that "degree of the crime" refers, not to degrees of 
murder alone, but to degrees of criminal homicide including 
.... ) 
) 
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manslaughter, and that "ls<;pr offense" refers to thr. h~II.<;l'r 
of the two df'.grees or criminal homicide bctwecn which tht~ 
doubt exists. It thus makes clear that the principle of reason-
able doubt applies not only between first and second degree 
murder but also between second degree murder and man-
j;h.!l1ght~r. 
[8a] The failure of the trial court to instruct on the 
effect of a reasonable doubt as between any of the included 
offenses, when it had instructed as to the effect of such doubt 
as between the two highest offenses, and as between the lowest 
offense and justifiable homicide, left the instructions· with the 
clearly erroneous implication that the rule requiring .a finding 
of guilt of the lesser offense applied only as between first and 
second degree murder. This case was a close one on its facts. 
While there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction 
of second degree murder, a finding that the offense was man-
slaughter would be equally warranted. [9] Even if the jury 
disbelieved defendant's testimony that he did not intend to hit 
Glover and concluded that the crime was not involuntary 
manslaughter, it was still presented with substanti~l evidence 
of provocation, much of which was undisputed, that would 
support a finding of voluntary manslaughter. (See People v. 
Keel, 91 Cal.App. 599, 604-606 [267 P. 161].) Glover had 
taken defendant's money and only returned part of it, passing 
the rest to his wife. Defendant could reasonably conclude 
that Glover intended to steal his money, and he testified that 
Glover made a menacing gesture toward him and told him 
that if he did not shut up he would lose more than his money. 
Defendant was entitled to have this evidence considered in 
the light of the rule of reasonable doubt, not only on the issue 
of self-defense, but also on the issue of provocation sufticient 
to reduce the killing from second degree murder to man-
slaughter. The record demonstrates that the jury considered 
the distinction between these offenses crucial and had difticulty 
with it. Six hours after the case was submitted to them, they 
returned to the courtroom and requested C C once again tIle 
legal interpretation of murder in the second degree and volun-
tary manslaughter," and again the defendant requested that 
bis instruction be given, and again his request was denied. 
The proposed instruction should have been given. It went 
directly to the defense of reasonable doubt of defendant's 
guilt of second degree murder; it was clearly responsive to an 
issue raised by the evidence (People v. Oar'TIi'TIe, 41 CaL2d 384, 
389-390 [260 P.2d 16] ; People v. Hudson, 45 Ca1.2d 121, 126 
) 
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[287 P.2d 497]) ; and it was essential to cure the misleading 
effect of its absence in the light of the other instructions 
given. [8b] Under these circumstances there exists "such 
an equal balance of reasonable probabilities as to leave the 
court in serious doubt as to whether the error has affected the 
result," and accordingly the error is prejudicial. (People v. 
Watson, 46 Ca1.2d 818, 837 [299 P.2d 243].) The error did 
not, however, have any bearing on defendant's conviction of 
violating Penal Code, section 12021. ! 
The judgment and the order denying a new trial are re- \ 
versed as to count one charging murder. In all other respects: 
they are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
McCOMB, Concurring and Dissenting.-I would affirm the 
judgment for the reasons stated by Mr. Presiding Justice 
Kaufman in the opinion prepared by him for the District 
Court of Appeal in People v. Dewber'll (Cal.App.), 327 P. 
2d 616. 
! 
